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Abstract 
Economic analysis takes as its defining performance benchmark the pursuit of increases in 
welfare (efficiency).  Competition is merely one of a variety of means of achieving the 
efficiency end, especially in industries where the underlying economic circumstances 
predispose them towards greatest efficiency when competition (in the form of many market 
participants) is restricted.   Typically, regulatory intervention in these industries is justified by 
the imperative to increase efficiency.  Competition law and industry-specific regulation 
provide two competing means of intervention whereby the pursuit of efficiency can be 
enhanced.  The challenge is in determining how to allocate responsibility for governance of 
industry interaction between these two institutional forms.  Whilst competition law can 
govern interaction in most industries, where the underlying economic conditions are 
sufficiently different, industry-specific regulation offers advantages.  However, its weakness 
is the risk of capture, leading to the subjugation of the efficiency end to the pursuit of other 
objectives (e.g. competition – the means – as an end in itself).  But if the regulatory institution 
could be bound in some way to pursue an efficiency objective, could the risk of capture be 
averted? 
 
By exploring the attempts to prioritise the pursuit of efficiency via both competition law and 
industry-specific regulation in New Zealand over the past twenty years, this paper concludes 
that such an endeavour is unlikely to be successful in the long run.  As politicians ultimately 
control the rules by which the regulatory responsibilities are allocated, and politicians are 
themselves pose a potential risk of capture for the industry-specific regulatory processes, the 
inability of a government prioritising efficiency objectives to bind its successors to the same 
objectives means that the efficiency objective is not stable.  From the New Zealand 
experience, the outcome could be total subjugation of industry-specific regulation to direct 
political control and the abandonment of efficiency as a primary regulatory objective.  This 
suggests that, imperfect though it may be, competition law overseen by a judiciary with 
greater independence of the political process, offers the best chance of enshrining pursuit of 
efficiency into the governance of industry interaction, even in industries normally the focus of 
industry-specific regulation.   
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1. Competition or Regulation? 
Economic analysis takes, as its defining performance benchmark, the pursuit of increases in 
efficiency (welfare), measured as the sum of consumer and producer (i.e. total) surplus.  In 
this paradigm, an increase in total surplus is strictly preferable to the status quo or a decrease 
in total surplus.  An action that brings about a greater efficiency increase is therefore strictly 
preferable to one leading to a lesser increase, maintains the status quo, or leads to a decrease.  
In this context, the primary normative objective of law- and policy-making is the promotion 
of economic efficiency via the elimination of market efficiencies (Schmalansee, 1979; Kahn, 
1970; 1975).   
 
Whilst a minority of economists, and many consumer advocates, propose the use of law- and 
policy-making powers principally as a means of achieving distributional objectives 
independent of their effects upon total efficiency (e.g. Feldstein, 1972a; 1972b), their use for 
this purpose is extremely difficult to achieve in practice (Schmalansee, 1979), and possibly 
counter-productive (Kahn, 1975; Peltzman, 1976).  Furthermore, as distributional objectives 
are highly subjective, it is very difficult to adjudge the ‘success’ of any distribution-motivated 
intervention.  By contrast, efficiency is an objective measure that provides a useful 
benchmark for the economic assessment of law- and policy-making performance, even if 
redistribution is a primary consideration.  The Kaldor-Hicks criterion holds that if total 
welfare (efficiency) is greater as a consequence of a law or policy change, then the gains to 
the winners will be greater than the losses incurred by the losers, and the change 
economically justified, irrespective of whether the gains are actually shared (i.e. redistribution 
occurs) (Connolly & Munro, 1999).   
 
Consequently, the pursuit of increased efficiency is broadly accepted as the principal 
economic justification for the enactment of competition (antitrust) law overseen by courts and 
judges and industry-specific regulation, overseen by regulators and regulatory agencies  
(Carlton & Perloff, 2005).  In the United States context, since the passing of the Interstate 
Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), “regulation and antitrust have operated as 
competing mechanisms to control competition” (Carlton & Picker, 2007:1).  The challenge 
for law- and policy-makers is in determining a balance in the allocation of responsibilities 
between the courts enforcing the generic antitrust obligations of firms and regulatory 
authorities overseeing efficient operation within specific industries where underlying 
economic characteristics predispose them to efficiency limitations, in a manner that best 
promotes the pursuit of increased efficiency.  
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1.1 Courts or Regulators? 
It is far from clear that either the courts or industry-specific regulatory bodies have embedded 
in their legislative underpinnings or operational capacities the ability to take full account of  
all relevant issues of economic efficiency.  Carlton & Picker (2007) suggest that the 
development of an independent United States jurisprudence has enabled economic principles 
to be increasingly included in judicial decision-making, in a manner that is not possible in 
less-independent industry-specific regulation.   
 
However, whilst court-governed processes can give weight to promoting increases in 
economic efficiency, they are constrained in their ability to promote its maximisation under 
the prevailing constraints.  Courts are reactive, responding only to those cases and those 
points of law brought before them.  Judges have no mandate to address potentially efficiency-
raising issues that market participants choose not to pursue in litigation.  Their decisions thus 
lead to incremental changes over a small range of issues, which are not necessarily the most 
important from a broader efficiency perspective.   
 
Moreover, even when cases are brought, they are adjudicated by generalist antitrust judges 
who in most cases lack the industry-specific economic knowledge upon which efficiency 
decisions may turn.  The quality of the judgements is conditional upon the quality of advice 
available (e.g. access of the panel to expert lay members) and the analysis and range of issues 
presented by the litigants.  The precedents set in jurisprudence also hinge upon the economics 
of the test cases.   Precedents formed upon the basis of underlying economic characteristics in 
one industry may not transfer neatly into industries where different underlying economic 
characteristics prevail.  For example, high fixed and sunk costs induce a different form of 
competitive interaction between industry participants, and different efficiency outcomes, than 
where these cost are low or non-existent.   For example, whereas competitive behaviour 
favouring a large number of market participants driving price towards marginal cost raises 
efficiency in most industries, where sunk costs are large, injudicious entry and pursuit of 
marginal cost pricing creates, rather than ameliorates, market failure with its associated loss 
of efficiency (Carlton and Perloff, 2005).   
 
The risks of judicial economic error associated with economically ‘different’ industries – 
predominantly the network industries such as telecommunications, electricity, railways, 
airlines and other transport – suggest that the creation of industry-specific regulators to 
govern industry interaction has the potential to improve decision-making and is indeed an  
economically rational response to the limitations of jurisprudence.   Industry-specific 
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regulators in most cases have the requisite economic knowledge to give due weight to 
efficiency considerations.  They can also be given a much broader mandate to investigate 
issues which in their judgement warrant attention.  Rather than being reactive, they can be 
proactive – a power that when applied appropriately can lead to increases in efficiency.  
Proactive power thus tends towards more radical industry change in regulator-governed 
regimes than is observed in antitrust-governed ones, enabling the capture of efficiency gains 
in a more-timely manner than is possible under court-governed processes.  
 
However, unlike judges who in most jurisdictions are independent of political processes, 
regulators’ comparative lack of independence exposes them to greater risk of capture, either 
by either the politicians who grant them authority in the first place, or industry participants, 
with whom they are most closely associated in their daily activities, and whose livelihoods 
depend upon the regulator’s decisions.  This predisposes regulatory decisions towards a 
greater emphasis upon redistributive rather than economic efficiency issues.  The measure of 
a regulatory regime’s effectiveness and ability to deliver upon the efficiency objective turns 
upon firstly the extent to which it is charged with the pursuit of economic efficiency, and 
secondly the regulator’s ability to adhere to the efficiency objective in the face of pressures 
which will inevitably come to bear upon it to deviate towards favouring specific redistributive 
desires.   
 
1.2 Regulation to Promote Competition? 
Striking a balance in the allocation of industry governance responsibilities between 
competition law and industry-specific regulation assumes considerable importance when 
industry-specific regulatory policy derives its mandate from the pursuit of increased 
efficiency through the mechanism of increased competition.  As competitive interaction takes 
on many different forms, industry economic characteristics will determine the appropriate 
form against which industry performance must be tested in order to ensure the efficiency 
objective is furthered. Starting from the presumption that competition law promotes 
competition because competition increases efficiency, and that industry-specific regulation 
exists in some industries because competition law alone in inadequate for delivering timely 
efficiency improvements due to different economic characteristics that lead to a different set 
of interactions in order to achieve optimal efficiency, then a regulatory agency inducing 
competition in such an industry must of necessity be inducing competition of a different form 
(e.g. oligopoly/monopolistic competition) than would have prevailed otherwise (e.g. perfect 
competition).    
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Is it feasible, therefore, to presume that regulator-induced competitive activity could ever be 
subject to the same legal processes and precedents as pertain to other industries, as long as the 
different underlying economic characteristics prevail?  It would seem that the answer lies in 
the ability of the courts to have access to sufficient industry-specific economic analysis to 
understand the differences between regulator-induced competitive interaction and endogenous 
competitive interaction.  Sidak (2008) illustrates conflicts arising in different jurisdictions 
regarding the legality of ‘price squeezes’ induced by regulatory duties to deal that would not 
occur normally in an unregulated market.  Economic analysis incorporating the upstream 
origin of the ‘squeeze’ arrives at a different efficiency finding than analysis taking as its 
starting point only the action in the downstream retail product market.  Whilst a sufficiently 
well-informed court may be able to make an efficiency-raising decision, Sidak’s comparison 
of the range of different judgements arrived at by courts in different circuits in the United 
States and in the European Union on essentially the same facts suggests that it is not at all 
clear that courts in all jurisdictions are capable at the current point in time of acting with 
consistently in a manner that promotes efficiency given the economic complexities attendant 
to  the different forms of competition induced by regulatory intervention. 
 
1.3 Does Regulation to Promote Competition Always Enhance Efficiency? 
By derivation, a second key consideration in the allocation of industry governance 
responsibilities hinges on the types of competitive interaction induced by regulators.  Whilst 
the economic motivation for the assignment of responsibility to regulatory bodies lies in the 
potential to apply industry-specific economic understanding for the pursuit of increased 
efficiency, the risk exists that regulatory powers can be captured by strong stakeholders and 
used for the pursuit of other (especially redistribution) agendas.  A particular risk attends the 
pursuit of competition as an objective in its own right.  Is it rational to substitute pursuit of 
competition as a regulatory objective on the presumption that it is a proxy for the pursuit of 
efficiency?  
 
Crucially, the appropriateness of the competition objective for regulated industries lies not in 
the pursuit of static ‘perfect competition’ where it is presumed that the number of participants 
producing an homogeneous good is infinite and price is driven to marginal cost, but in the 
pursuit of alternative competitive processes that take into consideration the cost structures of 
industries with high fixed and sunk costs, and the dynamic incentives associated with a 
smaller number of firms investing very large sums in differentiated technologies across time 
(Alleman & Rappoport, 2005).  If the different economic standards did not prevail, then ipso 
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facto, it would be unnecessary to delegate responsibility to a regulatory agency in the first 
place.  Competition law governance would suffice.   
 
1.4 Privatisation and the Pursuit of Competition 
A third consideration attends the simultaneous forces of competition, regulation and 
privatisation.  Regulating an historically government-owned natural monopoly interlaces a 
‘competition’ imperative with the ‘privatisation’ imperative in a manner that exposes the 
regulatory process to even greater pressure to take account of distributional considerations 
than might normally be the case.  Whilst privatisation is pursued in the first place to increase 
efficiency, it is not strictly necessary that privatisation must be twinned with competition, 
unless the competition pursued is of a form that promotes ongoing efficiency gains.   
Moreover, combining the two objectives into one policy action invokes the classic tension 
between competing objectives, where the best-rewarded objective will prevail (Holmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1991).  This is further complicated by the need to secure a political mandate to 
undertake either action, leading to the risk that a third, non-efficiency objective will prevail.  
The risk of the efficiency objective being even further diluted is increased if the prioritisation 
is undertaken by politicians even less well informed about the economic consequences of 
their actions than judges or regulators.   
 
For example, the competitive incentives for industry entry are driven by the pursuit of profits.  
Yet in order to secure a mandate for privatisation, politicians typically bind the privatised 
incumbent with social obligations (e.g. universal service) and pricing restraints (e.g. caps, 
mandatory cost-based prices) which constrain the incumbent’s profits and alter its incentives 
relative to those of competitors should pursuit of competition be a concurrent policy 
objective.  Different treatment of the incumbent and its competitors in the face of competition 
is a redistributive imperative, and effectively relegates pursuit of efficiency to a secondary 
role, at least in the short-term.  Pursuit of redistribution is further exacerbated if competitive 
entry occurs as a consequence of arbitrage based upon regulatory restrictions on the 
incumbent rather than as a consequence of more efficient production processes or welfare-
enhancing product differentiation.  Politicians are predisposed to lobbying by interested 
parties for purely redistributive purposes, and are poorly equipped to appraise the complex 
economic consequences of redistributive trades upon the efficiency objective.  Inappropriately 
conflating pursuit of competition measured solely as competitive entry with pursuit of 
efficiency is therefore more likely to occur, exacerbating the potential of self-interested 
motivations amongst politicians as agents of voters favouring the pursuit of competition 
simply because ‘evidence’ in the form of decreased incumbent market share is very visible in 
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the short-run political (voting) horizon, whereas efficiency improvements are less tangible, 
broadly spread and take time to accrue.   
 
In the longer-run, the effects upon dynamic efficiency of competition pursued for its own sake 
may be profoundly detrimental.  Short-run entry pursued for redistributive or static efficiency 
purposes without due consideration of long-run dynamic investment and efficiency incentives 
is counter-productive (Hausman, 1999; Crandall, Ingraham & Singer, 2004; Pindyck, 2004; 
2005; Guthrie, 2007).  Greater dynamic efficiency gains may be achieved by preventing, 
rather than encouraging, competitive entry (e.g. regulatory holidays – Gans & King, 2004). 
Likewise, entry induced by the imposition of asymmetric obligations upon the incumbent 
(e.g. universal service obligations distorting price signals and inducing entry by participants 
with higher costs than the incumbent; service-level entry on the basis of arbitrage on 
regulated access tariffs) is unlikely to be either efficiency-raising (Quigley, 2004) or 
sustainable long-term (e.g. as evidenced by the ‘price squeeze literature – Sidak, 2008).   
 
1.5 An Institutional Solution? 
In summary, therefore, three issues appear to bear materially upon the decision of how to 
allocate industry governance responsibilities between courts and regulators in order to 
promote the pursuit of efficiency: 
1. some industries are so economically different that different treatment is warranted 
2. the competitive interaction in these industries is, by dint of their economic 
differences, sufficiently different from that in other industries that different tests 
should apply 
3. the pursuit of competition in the economically different industries is complicated 
by the simultaneous pursuit of privatisation, leading to potential conflicts in 
agendas and the risk that efficiency will be subjugated to other objectives, and 
especially the pursuit of a particular form of competition that is incompatible with 
increasing efficiency in the industry in question.   
 
If the competition means pursued is a poor proxy for the pursuit of the desired efficiency end, 
and the risk of subversion of the primary objective in pursuit of alternative outcomes is high, 
the question must be asked whether the pursuit of competition should form any part of a 
regulatory mandate.  Again, the answer is not straightforward.  The principal difficulty lies in 
the application of a process, and is not necessarily inherent in the institutions themselves.   
Courts are constrained in their mandate to address important efficiency issues by the 
limitation that they address only the issues brought before them.  Regulators are constrained 
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because their wider mandate exposes them to greater risk of capture.  Politicians are a key 
source of the risk of capture, by the very nature of their powers allows them to capture the 
regulatory process. If a regulatory body could be established with an explicit, transparent and 
accountable objective to undertake its activities giving full weight to efficiency 
considerations, in each of their productive, allocative and dynamic dimensions, then it might 
be feasible to strike a balance between the pursuit of competition within the confines of the 
industry’s underlying economic characteristics, in a manner that complements the parallel 
consideration accorded to efficiency in competition law jurisprudence.   
 
However, under agency theory, to be successful in its pursuit of efficiency, the regulatory 
body, as agent of the government that creates it, must be able to stand firm against the 
potential of capture by the government, which will necessarily have its own redistributive 
agendas.  As elimination of the regulator’s ability to effect redistributive goals will likely 
intensify the degree of self-interested lobbying directed at politicians, the risk of government 
capture will intensify.  The political principal holding formal power to direct the regulator-
agent is also agent of the wider public, which has imposed the duty to act in a manner that 
increases total welfare, but is itself subject to self-interested action.  To withstand formal 
political power and remain true to the efficiency objective, the regulatory body must be able 
to exhibit the same degree of political independence that characterises the judiciary.  To do so 
appears to necessitate regulatory bodies having the same degree of constitutional separation 
from political imperatives as enjoyed by the courts.  Only then would it appear that due 
weight can be given to efficiency considerations in regulatory-governed processes.  Yet 
enacting such a change requires the political participants to suspend their natural inclinations 
to further their own position, so it is unlikely to occur.  As the New Zealand case study will 
show, even when one exceptional government does suspend its self-interest to prioritise the 
pursuit of efficiency, its inability to bind future governments renders the change unstable.   
 
Flawed though the processes may be, court-governed competition law – in the form of an 
institutional second-best - appears to offer greater assurance that the pursuit of efficiency will 
be the prevailing objective in industries that would otherwise appear to lend themselves to 
industry-specific regulation.    
 
2. The New Zealand Telecommunications Case Study 
New Zealand telecommunications regulation from 1987 to the present offers a cogent 
example of the vulnerability of even those regulatory agencies designed with economic 
efficiency objectives in mind to capture by political principals in order to pursue alternative 
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objectives.  In the New Zealand example, over time the pursuit of competition as a political 
priority has prevailed over pursuit of efficiency, even though efficiency was explicitly 
articulated initially as the prevailing political objective, and reliance upon competition law 
alone was the starting point for the allocation of industry regulatory governance.  Even when 
an industry-specific regulator was established and pursuit of efficiency was afforded weight 
in the body’s legislative mandate, pursuit of efficiency was exposed, and succumbed 
eventually to politically-motivated subjective redistribution.   
 
Whereas typically, political capture of regulatory processes occurs informally as covert 
exertion of pressure and influence, the New Zealand case illustrates that statutory expression 
of the intention to prioritise efficiency as a key regulatory objective has resulted in the capture 
becoming formalised as overt political action.  Political dissatisfaction with both court 
adjudications and regulatory recommendations based upon efficiency criteria has resulted in a  
third body – the office of the Minister of Communications and the affiliated Ministry of 
Economic Development – assuming responsibility for a range of functions normally delegated 
to the purview of an industry-specific regulator.  In the absence of legislative or constitutional 
formalisation of this action, it is not clear whether the result is intended as competition for or 
a complement to competition law and regulation.  What remains clear, however, is that to date 
political decision-making has given very little weight to efficiency considerations, has 
reduced industry certainty as it lacks precedents, and is subject to few of the checks and 
balances of either competition law or regulatory processes.   
   
2.1 Efficiency Underpins ‘Light-handed’ Regime 
New Zealand led the world in ‘light-handed’ regulation when from 1984, the government 
embarked upon a comprehensive restructuring of the country’s economy.  The clearly 
articulated objective of increasing economic efficiency and creating “wherever possible, a 
competitive environment in which markets can operate relatively free from subsequent 
intervention by government” (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996:1863).  As part of 
this process, he Commerce Act 1986 was enacted with the objective of promoting 
competition for the long-term benefit of consumers and the Telecommunications Act 1987 
eschewed industry-specific regulation in favour of generic competition law under the 
provisions of the Commerce Act.   
 
Efficiency considerations were paramount in the choice of institutional mechanisms for 
industry governance.  As a small economy with only a little over 4 million people, New 
Zealand could access economies of scale in the regulatory process itself if a single institution 
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governed all commercial activity.   The costs, inflexibility and bureaucratic capture 
weaknesses were explicitly identified as avoidable under a competition law regime 
(MoC/Treasury, 1995; Blanchard, 1995).  Whilst the limitations attendant with non-specialist 
judges existed, it was also clear that New Zealand’s specific economic circumstances – small 
population, low population density, geographical isolation, challenging terrain, thin capital 
markets and historically highly-concentrated industries –posed challenges to the enactment of 
competition law not faced in other jurisdictions (Arnold, Boles de Boer & Evans, 2003).  On 
balance, the establishment of a single institution to capture scale economies as well as ensure 
consistency in application was favoured.  However, Part IV of the Commerce Act explicitly 
provided for the government to impose price controls in industries where market power 
existed, should this be deemed necessary.    
 
Although ‘lightly-regulated, the telecommunications sector was far from unregulated.  When 
the state-owned monopoly incumbent was privatised in 1990, contractual obligations known 
as the ‘Kiwi Share’ (subsequently the Telecommunications Service Obligation or TSO) 
imposed rural-urban and free local calling universal service obligations and a price cap on 
residential line rentals that could be broken only with the express permission of the Minister, 
and even then only where it could be demonstrated that the incumbent was under financial 
duress.  The paramount principle was that contractual agreement, rather than overt regulation, 
offered the most cost-effective means of advancing the pursuit of increased efficiency.  
 
The New Zealand arrangements thus constituted an action of a government suspending its 
primary tendencies to create a set of governance arrangements that insulated the sector from 
politically–motivated actions that would dilute the pursuit of efficiency.  
 
2.1.1 Challenges to Competition Law 
The ‘light-handed’ regime prevailed until 2001, when it was replaced by an industry-specific 
regulatory body – the Office of the Telecommunications Commissioner – under the 
Telecommunications Act 2001.  During the period of light-handed regulation, only two 
Commerce Act actions alleging exertion of a dominant position were brought against the 
incumbent – one by new entrant Clear Communications in 1991 (Clear case), and one by the 
Commerce Commission in 1999 (0867 case).  After hearings in the High Court1, Court of 
Appeal2 and Privy Council3, the incumbent was ultimately found in the Clear case not to have 
acted anti-competitively by including in its interconnection prices to competitors a component 
                                                     
1 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR 166 (HC)  
2 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR413 (CA)  
3 Telecom Corporation v Clear Communications [1994] 5 NZBLC 103, 552 (PC); [1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC) passim 
to recover the costs of the universal service obligation (adoption of the Baumol-Willig 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule was adjudged to be a legitimate competitive action by the 
incumbent).  The 0867 case is still sub-judice, and pertains to the requirement by the 
incumbent that all customers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) not subscribing to an 
incumbent-managed account (0867 calling prefix) pay 2c per minute for internet traffic over 
ten hours per month previously provided free of charge under the ‘Kiwi Share’ free 
residential local calling obligation.  The measure was introduced to counter arbitrage on the 
basis of interconnection payments between the incumbent and its competitors as a 
consequence of the growth in volume of internet calls of longer duration than voice calls.  
Competitors alleged the action was an exertion of a dominant position as it reduced the 
desirability for ISPs to purchase their connections, but had been approved by the Minister.   
Price arbitrage was induced principally as a consequence of the universal service ‘free 
calling’ obligation, and was putting the incumbent under severe financial duress (Howell, 
2007).   
 
It is far from clear that the ‘light-handed’ New Zealand regime performed any worse over the 
1990s than industry-specific regimes using efficiency gains as a benchmark.   The New 
Zealand residential telephony price index fell by more than the OECD average over this 
period, and free residential dial-up internet telephony access led to the country becoming a 
world leader in internet connection and use (Howell, 2007).  Dynamic efficiency did not 
appear to be impaired, as the incumbent was one of the OECD’s earliest DSL adopters 
(January, 1999), using a high-speed (2Mbps) service widely available (85% of the population 
had access by 2003) priced very low taking speed into account (Howell, 2003).    Yet, as the 
incumbent still held a very large market share, and was clearly charging prices in excess of 
marginal cost, even if only to recoup universal service obligation costs, a significant number 
of market participants (principally competitors to the incumbent and opponents of 
privatisation) urged for the introduction of industry-specific regulation.   
 
2.1.2 Distribution and Efficiency Implications of Court Decisions 
The justification most commonly cited by proponents of industry-specific regulation was the 
extent to which the incumbent’s prices exceeded marginal cost.  This issue, at the core of the 
Clear case, is in essence a distributional and not an efficiency one.  Whilst the High Court and 
Privy Council both found that Telecom could use ECPR pricing to recover social costs from 
the “Kiwi Share’, the Court of Appeal found that any price including a component of 
monopoly rent (i.e. above marginal cost) was anti-competitive.   
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The implication of the Court of Appeal judgement was that the incumbent alone should bear 
the costs of the social obligations (a distributional issue).  Competitors’ costs would therefore 
be lower than the incumbent’s in the areas where the incumbent recovered the costs of the 
social obligations, making selective entry into low-cost areas more profitable for competitors 
and making the incumbent’s business financially unsustainable (i.e. transferring profits 
otherwise used by the incumbent to subsidise unprofitable connections into the pockets of 
competitors).  Furthermore, if entrants faced none of the social costs, they could profitably 
enter in a low-cost area even if their costs exceeded the incumbent’s, as long as they fell 
below the incumbent’s prices including the social cost recovery.  Such entry would lead to 
decreases in efficiency, but held favour with the incumbent’s competitors and opponents of 
privatisation who preferred that a disproportionate share of the costs of the social obligations 
fall on the private sector owners of the formerly government-owned network rather than being 
spread across the industry and thereby all consumers of telecommunications services 
irrespective of the identity of the provider.   
 
By contrast, the Privy Council (prevailing) decision preserved existing network investment 
incentives and ongoing incumbent financial sustainability, by ruling that the incumbent had 
priced exactly as a competitive firm could be expected to price its products, based upon its 
opportunity cost.   However, in doing so, it enshrined in precedent a pricing rule that could, 
under certain circumstances, result in less than efficient entry and hence lower product variety 
in downstream markets (Economides & White, 1995).  The decision was interpreted by some 
commentators at the time as an example of how court-based pursuit of ‘competitive’ 
outcomes might compromise pursuit of the efficiency objectives governing the design of the 
‘light-handed’ regime (Blanchard, 1994a; 1994b, 1995).  That is, pursuing competition (the 
means) compromised efficiency (the end).  The proposed solution was not the adoption of full 
industry-specific regulation, but rather a ‘light-handed’ process that sat under the Commerce 
Act and the courts (e.g. an arbitration process) enabling swifter resolution of disputes and 
with a wider mandate to consider efficiency issues not directly part of court pleadings 
(Blanchard, 1995).   
 
Following an inquiry in 1995 led by the New Zealand Treasury and the Ministry of 
Commerce (MoC/Treasury, 1995), the Minister of Communications expressed confidence in 
the existing system and stated that no changes would be made. The pursuit of economic 
efficiency as the prevailing sector objective was reinforced at the political level (para 209).   
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2.2 Politically-Mandated Review: 2000 
The election of a Labour Party-led coalition government in the November 1999 general 
election, however, resulted in a change in the prevailing political view regarding industry-
specific regulation.   In part as an electoral response to entrants’ dissatisfaction with the 
outcomes of the 1991-4 court decisions and popular politicized perceptions of the ‘failure’ of 
the ‘light-handed’ regime to result in reductions in the incumbent’s market share and degree 
of dominance, and in part to differentiate its approach from both the previous Labour 
government that had introduced ‘light-handed’ regulation from 1984, and the subsequent 
National Party and National-led coalition governments that had endorsed it, the Labour Party 
manifesto for the 1999 election promised reforms to the Commerce Act to tighten controls on 
firms with a dominant position, and an inquiry into the conduct of both the 
telecommunications and electricity industries.   
 
2.2.1 Efficiency Diluted by Distributional Concerns  
The new government stated its policy objective for the telecommunications industry as being 
“to ensure that the regulatory environment delivers cost efficient, timely, and innovative 
telecommunications services on an ongoing, fair and equitable basis to all existing and 
potential users”4.  The promised commission of inquiry was established early in 2000, with a 
brief to address (amongst other issues) “alternative means of establishing interconnection 
terms and conditions; pricing principles and other terms and conditions (such as service 
quality standards) for current and future forms of interconnection; processes applying to 
interconnection negotiations, including dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms; local 
loop unbundling; resale of telecommunications services; information disclosure;”5 the Kiwi 
share obligations, the numbering regime, number portability and the development of an 
information economy, including the impact of, and the effect of regulatory regimes on 
incentives to invest in, new technologies.  
 
The Inquiry appeared to interpret its brief as expressed in the government policy statement in 
efficiency-related terms.  ‘Cost-efficient’ was presumed to mean that services are produced 
“at the lowest cost and delivered to consumers at the lowest sustainable price” (p 11) (i.e. 
perfect productive and allocative efficiency), ‘timely’ to mean “the absence of barriers that 
would impede the implementation and uptake of innovative services” (dynamic efficiency) 
and ‘ongoing’ to mean “that regulation should be forward-looking, robust, durable and 
consistent over time, and not sacrifice long term gains for short-term considerations” (the 
                                                     
4 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____16432.aspx#tor  
5 ibid 
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trade-off between dynamic and static efficiency).  However, in doing so, the policy imposed 
multiple and conflicting objectives.  Both static and dynamic efficiency objectives  were to be 
addressed simultaneously, with no guidance given to which should take priority.  Moreover, 
the policy required both efficiency and distributional objectives to also be simultaneously 
satisfied.  “Fair and equitable’ was taken to mean “the way in which services are provided, 
the conduct of the industry players and their interactions”, suggesting weight would be given 
to competitor equity as well as consumer welfare.  The policy was clearly unable to be 
delivered, and without clear prioritisation criteria, left open considerable scope for the Inquiry 
itself to be captured by vested interests. 
 
2.2.2 Which Efficiency: Static or Dynamic? 
It was not surprising, therefore, that Inquiry concluded the incumbent’s prices still included 
elements of prices above cost, so, echoing the Court of Appeal decision, were not perfectly 
allocatively efficient.  The ‘light-handed’ regime was deemed to have failed to deliver the 
desired environment articulated in the government policy.  Establishment of an industry-
specific regulator setting TSLRIC-based prices for a variety of the incumbent’s fixed-line 
services, excluding value-added services such as ADSL6, was proposed. Again consistent 
with the Court of Appeal decision, distributive considerations prevailed in the Inquiry’s 
recommendation that the costs of social obligations be borne by the incumbent alone.  Yet, 
although the Inquiry ignored dynamic efficiency issues in its cost-benefit analysis for 
establishing the regulatory agency as they were deemed too difficult to quantify, local loop 
unbundling was rejected primarily as it failed to further the policy’s efficiency objectives7.   
Pragmatic political interest-trading rather than principled economic analysis thus appeared to 
prevail in the recommendations.  
 
                                                     
6 Regulation of ADSL was excluded because the Inquiry “believes Telecom should be allowed the normal competitive incentive 
to develop such new services with above-cost returns” and “that a judgement has to be made when considering regulation about 
the maturity of a market. It is inherently more risky to regulate prices of evolving services than those that are more mature, since 
regulation focussed on efficient pricing would erode rents that are necessary to spur innovation and rapid deployment of a new 
technology” (p 64).   
7 “Other reasons the Inquiry is not recommending full local-loop unbundling are: 
§ it does not seem to offer significant benefits to end users over and above those that could be achieved by requiring Telecom to 
wholesale its local-loop service in the way recommended by the Inquiry; 
§ the objective of local-loop unbundling – competitive delivery of local-loop services – is likely to be achieved in many areas and 
through a variety of technologies without regulatory intervention; 
§ full unbundling may not be exploited in areas where local-loop competition is not likely, given that such investment would 
ikely be unprofitable in the presence of the Kiwi Share and/or technically infeasible. In these areas, wholesaling or data tail 
access (leased lines) would give other providers the ability to offer customers a total service; and 
§ full unbundling is technically complex and would require Telecom to give up control of parts of its network” (p 64-5) 
 
2.3 Industry-Specific Regulation with Statutory Efficiency Objectives  
The government chose to give legislative force to almost all of the Inquiry’s 
recommendations in the terms of the Telecommunications Act 2001, thereby reinforcing the 
compromise of the pursuit of efficiency by the pursuit of other, largely distributional, 
objectives.  A Telecommunications Commissioner was established within the Commerce 
Commission, and TSLRIC pricing became mandatory for ‘designated’ services (retail minus 
pricing was imposed for lower-level ‘specified’ services), in part addressing the distributional 
objectives of competitors, albeit with some compromises to dynamic efficiency (Quigley, 
2004).   
 
Importantly, however, the costs of the ‘Kiwi Share’ social obligations were ring-fenced as the 
Telecommunications Service Obligation (TSO) levied as a charge on all industry participants 
as determined by the Commissioner, thereby avoiding some of the worst efficiency 
implications that would have arisen had the Court of Appeal decision not been overturned by 
the Privy Council.  Furthermore, the Act created in Section 18(2) a specific obligation for the 
Commissioner to take account of efficiency when making decisions and recommendations:  
“in determining whether or not, or the extent to which, any act or omission will result, or will 
be likely to result, in competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of 
end-users of telecommunications services within New Zealand, the efficiencies that will 
result, or will be likely to result, from that act or omission must be considered”.   
 
The Commissioner’s independence from political influence was also potentially safeguarded 
by inclusion within the Commerce Commission.  Under the Crown Entities Act, the 
Commerce Commission as an Independent Crown Entity (ICE) has the least obligation of any 
of the Crown Entities (statutory bodies outside of core government departments) to political 
imperatives.  An ICE is required to take account of government directives only where they are 
specifically required to do so as part of their legislated duties.  The intent is to ensure that any 
such obligations are subject to disclosure and debate, and are only imposed with the approval 
of parliament.  Other ICEs include the Law Commission, the Securities Commission, the 
Human Rights Commission and the offices of the Police Complaints Commissioner and the 
Health and Disability Commissioner.  Appointments of ICE commissioners are made in the 
name of the Governor General as Head of State rather than Ministers as agents of 
government.     
 
The statutory obligation that the Commission’s decisions take account of efficiency appeared 
to suggest that, despite some of the more radical Inquiry recommendations, it was the view of 
parliament that the efficiency objective remained important, albeit slightly diluted by the 
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other provisions of the Act.  Combined with the apparent independence of the Commission, it 
could be interpreted that the changes may have been an attempt to create the type of 
environment hypothesised above whereby a regulatory body could be charged with pursuing 
efficiency independent from risk of capture by vested (and especially political) interests.  
Indeed, at the time it was seen as an ‘enlightened’ form of industry-specific regulation.  The 
Inquiry panel stated that even its more radical recommendations “would still see New Zealand 
at very much the light-handed end of the regulatory spectrum, arguably the lightest within the 
OECD” (p 30).   
 
2.3.1 The LLU Test: Dynamic Efficiency Prevails 
The enforceability and political acceptability of decisions made using the legislated efficiency 
mandate were explicitly tested when the Commission undertook its statutory (Section 64) 
review into local loop unbundling in 2003.  The investigation was noteworthy internationally 
for the fact that it employed a cost-benefit analysis based upon a total welfare decision 
criterion (the sum of consumer and producer surplus as opposed to consumer welfare alone 
(Hausman & Sidak, 2005 – albeit subject to criticisms regarding the exclusion of investment 
in the model).  Dynamic efficiency principles were explicitly applied in making the 
recommendation ultimately not to proceed with unbundling:   
 
The Commission found that “the overall benefits from unbundling are not sufficiently 
persuasive to satisfy the Commission that a regulated solution is warranted”8.  Platform 
competition (e.g. from wireless networks) was considered likely to evolve and reduce the 
extent of the incumbent’s control of the bottleneck to access (para 788).   The experience of 
LLU internationally had been mixed in respect of increasing broadband penetration (para 
792).  The high costs of mandatory unbundling were also cited, including the critical point 
that the incentives for the incumbent to invest would be substantially reduced under LLU, and 
that this would have very significant effects upon the potential welfare gains for consumers 
(para 794).  
 
Instead, the Commission recommended accepting an offer by the incumbent to make 
available a limited bitstream service.  Given the incumbent’s imminent investment in a Next 
Generation Network (NGN), a lesser form of unbundled access would enable a limited 
amount of service-differentiated entry, whilst preserving the incumbent’s investment 
incentives and limiting entrants’ exposure to stranded assets in the event of the NGN resulting 
                                                     
8 Executive Summary, (v).  
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/LocalLoopUnbundling/ContentFiles/Docu
ments/Finalreportexecutivesummary.PDF  
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in the bypass of exchanges containing entrants’ equipment (Gans & King, 2004; Covec, 2004; 
Howell, 2007).   
 
The Minister accepted the Commission’s recommendations, apparently endorsing both the 
methodology used and the conclusions reached.  The decision was, however, received with 
considerable dismay by the incumbent’s competitors and other interested parties, who would 
undoubtedly have preferred a different outcome9.   For this decision, at least, industry-specific 
regulation constrained by an explicit efficiency obligation had resulted in an economically 
rational outcome. However, it also confirmed that, in the absence of any apparent ability to 
deviate the regulator from efficiency-based decision-making, the emphasis of lobbying would 
become concentrated in the political arena, thereby increasing the pressure on a less well-
informed decision-maker substantially more susceptible to acting opportunistically to resile 
from the efficiency criterion in future decisions.   
 
2.3.2 The Mobile Termination Test: Competition Trumps Efficiency 
The ongoing supremacy of the efficiency criterion was further tested by the Commission’s 
inquiry into mobile termination between 2004 and 2006.  The initial inquiry was instigated by 
the Commissioner, who cited “features of the mobile termination market that give rise to 
concerns about the exercise of market power by mobile carriers” that had led to “complaints 
that lack of competition in the mobile termination market means charges for fixed-to-mobile 
calls in New Zealand are unreasonably high”10.   
 
Once again, dynamic efficiency considerations underpinned the cost-benefit analysis which 
led to a recommendation in June 2005 that mobile termination charges for voice calls on 2G 
networks, but not 3G networks, be regulated.  The recommendation stated: “the Act does not 
direct the Commission as to the weight that it should give to efficiencies, as opposed to other 
considerations. This is a matter for the Commission to consider. Where there are tensions 
between short-term allocative efficiency and long-term dynamic efficiency, the Commission 
takes the view that giving greater weight to the latter will generally better promote 
competition for the long-term benefit of end-users” (para 28).  Nonetheless, greater weight 
was given to distributional considerations in this recommendation than in the LLU case, with 
consumer welfare, rather than total welfare, providing the decisive criterion.   
 
                                                     
9 See, for example, iHug’s submission to the Minister on the matter http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/5898/tcl-rsp-to-comcom-llu-
rpt-submission040209.pdf  
10 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa18200.aspx  
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In August 2005, the Minister rejected Commission’s recommendation and ordered a second 
review be undertaken.  The second review was to reconsider “definitional and implementation 
issues concerning 2G and 3G” and take into consideration “commercial offers made by 
Telecom and Vodafone following the Commission’s final report”11.  The Ministerial 
redirection appears to confirm that lobbying of politicians was now the preferred method of 
influencing regulatory decisions.  
 
The second report in April 2006 this time recommended that all fixed-to-mobile voice calls 
on all technology types be subject to regulation12 as “substantial net benefits to end users 
were likely to arise from making mobile termination a designated access service” (para 32)13.  
The redistributive consumer welfare decision criterion was defended: “where wealth transfers 
which are sustainable and not themselves conducive to inefficiency are likely to result from a 
measure promoting competition, the Commission ought to give weight to such transfers in the 
cost-benefit analysis” (para 34).   The inclusion of 3G technologies was justified as 
deployment had advanced between the first and second decisions to the extent that the 
Commission considered existing 3G investments to be irreversible.   
 
                                                     
 
More surprising, though, was the explicit rejection of the supremacy of efficiency in the 
Commission’s decision-making criteria over distributive considerations – a substantial change 
from the dynamic efficiency criterion emphasised in the first report. The Commission argued 
that its statutory authority actually prioritised the pursuit of competition as the prevailing 
sector objective – a fundamental change in the primary objective.  
 
Specifically, the Commission claimed that the Telecommunications Act created a distinction 
between the Commerce Act seeking to promote competition by restricting the aggregation of 
market power and controlling its use (sections 36 and 47), and the regulation of existing 
market power, as provided for in Part IV.  Part IV was deemed to focus upon the net benefit 
to acquirers – that is, it must take into account “the wealth transfer that occurs in reducing the 
excessive profits of the regulated party” (para 46) – an apparent acknowledgement of 
redistribution as the primary purpose of regulatory activity.  As the Telecommunications Act 
was deemed to derive as a consequence of Part IV-type dominance, the Commission was in 
no doubt that in addressing the tension between the promotion of competition (the means) and 
the pursuit of efficiency (the end),  the Telecommunications Act gave primacy to competition: 
11http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/MobileTerminationRates/ContentFiles/D
ocuments/Ministers%20letter%20to%20commission.pdf  
12http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/MobileTerminationRates/reportsandsubm
issions.aspx  
13Paragraph references relate to the final, revised report, which summarises the material in all of the preceding draft and final 
reports.   
“where there is a tension between the net public benefits and promotion of competition, the 
statutory context indicates that the primary consideration is the promotion of competition” 
(para 47).  A paragraph later: “the Telecommunications Act is focused on regulating access to 
promote competition. It does not provide a mechanism that specifically allows for efficiency 
considerations to take precedence over the promotion of competition.  Nor is there anything in 
the statutory scheme to suggest that this should be the case”.   
 
In light of the imperative in Section 18(2) of the Telecommunications Act that decisions must 
“consider” “efficiencies that result, or will likely result” from an “act or omission” by the 
Commission in regulating “competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term 
benefit of end-users of telecommunication services within New Zealand”, the key appears to 
be in the Commission’s interpretation of what is meant by “consider”.  For pursuit of 
competition to override pursuit of efficiency, “consider” must constitute only an obligation to 
demonstrate that as some part of the decision process, efficiency issues were raised.  This 
would parallel the “consideration” given to submissions by interested parties when coming to 
a recommendation, as attends other processes such as government consultation exercises.  
That is, Section 18(2) was deemed to contain no statutory obligation that efficiency 
considerations should have any material effect upon the final recommendation if, in taking 
them into account, the pursuit of competition was impaired.  The interpretation effectively 
subjugates an objective criterion recognised in economics as the primary objective of 
competition law and the principal justification for regulatory intervention (the end) to the 
pursuit of only one of a range of  possible means of achieving that objective (competition – 
although which of the various forms of competition which must be prioritised is itself a 
subjective matter).   
 
If the Commission’s view is accepted as legitimate, then it constitutes an admission that all of 
the previous Commission decisions prioritising efficiency were based upon an erroneous 
interpretation of the government’s intentions when passing the Act.  In the historical context, 
this view is perplexing given that the Act derived from an Inquiry which gave explicit voice 
(if not fully implementing) efficiency considerations in making its recommendations, and that 
the government of the time rejected some of the more radical distributive recommendations of 
the Inquiry in favour of mechanisms more consistent with the pursuit of efficiency (e.g. 
overriding the recommendation that the incumbent alone meet social obligation costs in 
favour of an industry-wide cost allocation).  A plausible alternative explanation for the radical 
departure from previous decision-making precedents is that the prevailing political objectives 
changed between the passing of the Act in 2001 and the 2006 mobile termination decision, 
and that as an agent of the political principals, the Commission became subject to pressures to 
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resile from its previous prioritisation of efficiency in favour of a set of more politically 
acceptable criteria.  That the Minister, when rejecting the first recommendation, instructed the 
Commission to take account of alternative offers made to the Minister by the firms facing 
regulation, appears to offer evidence in support of this view.  An acknowledgement of 
subservience to the Minister is contained in the acknowledgement that ultimately “the role of 
the Commission is to recommend and it is for the Minister to determine” (para 53).    
 
That the prioritisation of competition over efficiency has occurred in the New Zealand case is 
not inconsistent with the scenario discussed in section one, whereby indiscriminate 
prioritisation of competition is a likely consequence of conflict between privatisation 
objectives and regulatory imperatives.  Inappropriate substitution of the means for the end is 
more likely when the decision-maker is not an economic expert.  This line of thinking leads to 
the conclusion that successive lobbying for redistribution to prevail have successfully led to 
not just the overturning of the efficiency objective and its replacement with a competition 
one, but also a fundamental change in the control of regulatory decision-making.  Ultimately, 
it is the Minister and not the Commissioner who exercises regulatory control.  
 
2.3.3 A Shift in Regulatory Control 
The shift in the balance of regulatory control is confirmed by political rejection in 2007 of 
even the second recommendation to regulate mobile termination rates14, in favour of a set of 
undertakings by the potentially-regulated firms brokered by the Minister of Economic 
Development15 (the Minister of Communications having declared a conflict of interest as a 
consequence of a legal dispute with one of the companies facing regulation).     
 
As postulated in Section One, an independent regulatory body charged by legislation with 
pursuit of efficiency cannot respond as flexibly to attempts to capture its processes for 
distributional purposes as one with less binding criteria.  When the interests seeking to 
capture the agenda are political principals, the lack of flexibility can be overridden by 
assumption of regulatory decision-making at the political level as a consequence of the formal 
power of the political principals.  In the New Zealand case, it would seem that a change in 
political objectives necessitating the replacement of the pursuit of efficiency with the pursuit 
of competition for some distributive purpose would best explain the abrupt change in 
decision-making in the second mobile termination decision. 
 
                                                     
14 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29126 
15 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DoumentID=28525 
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2.4. Political Usurpation of Industry Regulation in the Pursuit of Competition 
Confirmation of the likely political origins of the Commission’s change to the pursuit of 
competition as its primary objective comes from the Labour Party manifesto for the 
September 2005 general election.  The manifesto proclaimed “this Labour-led government 
has ended the destructive period of ultra-light handed regulation that stifled competition, 
growth and consumer choice in ICT markets” and promised to “closely monitor and enforce 
commitments made by Telecom New Zealand16 under the local loop unbundling decisions 
and ensure targets for broadband uptake for the next three years as outlined in the Digital 
Strategy are met” 17.    The election resulted in a minority Labour-led government with a one-
member majority based upon one coalition partner and two minor parties bound by 
confidence and supply agreements.  The primacy of competition as the prevailing political 
objective for the sector was reinforced by the November speech from the throne outlining the 
new government’s agenda: “with respect to ICT, my government will be advancing policies 
to ensure that the telecommunications sector becomes more competitive and that we achieve 
faster broadband uptake in line with our competitors”18. 
 
2.4.1 Ministry-Led Stocktake and a New Telecommunications Act 
In December 2005, the Ministry of Economic Development began a ‘Stocktake’ of the 
telecommunications industry, with its primary focus “the broadband market and our 
broadband performance as a factor in economic performance” (MED, 2006).  Given that the 
expertise to undertake the investigation lay principally in the Telecommunications 
Commission, the use of policy ministry to undertake an assessment of industry performance 
implies a lack of political confidence in the Commission and its processes.  It also suggests a 
lack of certainty that a Commission-led analysis “taking account of” efficiency would deliver 
a set of recommendations consistent with the government’s explicit competition agenda to 
which it was already committed.    It also cannot be discounted that the Ministry was 
preferred for conducting the review specifically because, unlike the Commission, it is not 
explicitly bound by a requirement even to take account of efficiency in its analyses.    
 
The Stocktake report (MED, 2006), released in May 2006, is notable for its lack of principled 
economic analysis (see Howell, 2006 for a detailed discussion).  In sharp contrast to 
Commission’s analyses, no cost-benefit analysis was undertaken.  The Regulatory Impact 
Statement accompanying the ‘Stocktake’ proposals rejects the validity of the Commission’s 
                                                     
16 The incumbent 
17 http://www.labour.org.nz/policy/jobs_and_economy/2005policy/Pol05-Comms/index.html  
18 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0511/S00104.htm (Despite successive attempts in June 2007 to retrieve the official version 
from http://www.dia.govt.nz/Pubforms.nsf/NZGZT/Speech187Nov05.pdf/$file/Speech187Nov05.pdf , it could not be retrieved.).  
This source appears to have reproduced the text complete, but this fact cannot be verified.    
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analysis in 2003, but specifically states that no new analysis is necessary to quantify the 
effects of the recommendations made.   
 
Rather, full local loop unbundling and functional separation of the incumbent were justified 
primarily on the basis of the broadband market failing to meet an arbitrary level of 
competitiveness defined by the share of connections sold by competitors to the incumbent19, 
and investment by the incumbent being deemed insufficient on the basis of slippage from an 
investment schedule proposed in 2003 and an unscientific benchmarking against a handful of 
other OECD countries. The efficacy of the remedies proposed was supported principally by 
an unscientific assertion that New Zealand’s low broadband uptake was explained principally 
by the low share of connections sold by competitors (Network Strategies, 2006), 
unsubstantiated assurances by unnamed OECD officials that LLU would increase both 
broadband uptake and investment by incumbents and entrants, and a survey of new entrants 
on their likely investment intentions in the event that LLU was mandated.   Submissions on 
the proposals were heard by a Select Committee comprised of generalist politicians rather 
than a panel of expert Commerce Commissioners, and were not subject to the three-stage 
Telecommunications Commission processes of a draft report, a quasi-court conference where 
the recommendations and written submissions on the draft report by all interested parties can 
be tested in a contestable manner, and a final report.  The process was not subject to appeal or 
review on either process or substance. 
 
The recommendations were enacted in December 2006.  Along with the provisions for full 
LLU and separation, a new section (19A) was added requiring the Commission to take 
account of any economic policies of the government that are communicated by the Minister in 
writing.  On face value, this appears to place the requirement to take account of government 
economic policies on the same footing as the requirement to take account of efficiency in 
making recommendations as per section 18(2)..  If treated as an imperative, as the efficiency 
obligation was from 2001 to 2005, it would appear to explicitly compromise the 
independence of the Commission from government by making it an instrument via which 
government economic policy is enacted.  Alternatively, if interpreted in the light of the 
second mobile termination inquiry, it could be subjugated, but only in favour of the pursuit of 
competition which, incidentally, was an economic policy of the government that incorporated 
the requirement in the first place.  Rather than clarify the Commission’s objectives, it appears 
                                                     
19 On February 2 2006, the Commissioner notified the Minister of Communications that at the end of 2005, whilst the number of 
ADSL broadband connections sold exceeded the target set in the 2005 agreement with Telecom by 11.6%, only 24.5%, rather 
than 33.3% had been sold by competitors to Telecom.   
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/MonitoringandReporting/ContentFiles/Documents/Telco
%20Key%20Stats%20-%20Quarterly%20Monitoring%20Report%20-%2031%20March%202007.pdf 
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that the new obligation compounds the problem of multiple priorities, and reduces the 
possibility that any of the objectives will be satisfactorily delivered.  Moreover, it creates a 
further tension if, in the future, government economic policies change again in a manner that 
brings them into conflict even with the competition imperative (e.g. nationalization of assets).    
 
Togerher, the 2006 Stocktake and Telecommunications Act amendments signal that the New 
Zealand regulatory process no longer makes any pretence of being independent.  The Ministry 
and politicians were now firmly established, by dint of formal legislative power, as the third 
party alongside the courts and the Commission in governing industry activities.  By extension, 
it highly unlikely that any of the three considerations deemed important in the consideration 
of the allocation of regulatory decision-making power to further economic efficiency ends 
will be brought to bear in future decisions under the current arrangements.   
 
2.4.2 Overt Ministerial Intervention 
In April 2007, the Minister of Communications released proposals for the functional 
separation of the incumbent.  In May, at the same time as he announced the appointment of a 
new Commissioner, he revealed that he, and not the Commissioner, would lead the separation 
process.  This was deemed by the Cabinet to “the urgency attached by the government to the 
need to secure a clear outcome on this matter in the shortest possible timeframe. Because this 
is a major structural issue and not a matter of micro regulation, this was felt and is still felt to 
be the appropriate way forward” 20.    
 
That the New Zealand political principals see the structure of an industry where almost all 
investment comes from the private sector as the prerogative of political control, whilst the 
role of regulators is a ‘micro’ one not only confirms the political assumption of regulatory 
control, but also is at considerable variance with the prevailing views espoused by the OECD 
and the ITU that industry-specific regulation be insulated from political processes to the 
greatest extent possible precisely to guard against the pursuit of short-term self-interested 
agendas.  As Ministerial supervision of separation marks the third time since the 2005 
election that the formal political power of the principal in the regulatory agreement was 
exerted in order to take back control of duties ordinarily in the ambit of a regulatory authority, 
there is little doubt that Ministerial control is now an embedded structural element of New 
Zealand telecommunications industry governance.   
 
                                                     
20 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29595  
3. Conclusion 
The unique New Zealand institutional structure appears to have evolved because the explicit 
attempts by governments in the past to create arrangements that prioritised the pursuit of 
efficiency above other considerations, first by the reliance upon competition law alone, and 
subsequently by explicitly including efficiency objectives in the mandate given to the  
industry-specific regulator, have ultimately failed to withstand the test of subsequent 
governments to firstly dilute the force of the efficiency mandate, and ultimately to capture the 
regulatory process as a means of furthering its own agenda.   The erosion of the efficiency 
mandate began gradually, but has accelerated since 2005.   
 
The chronology of the erosion illustrates the thesis that, despite the best of intentions, 
ultimately the governance arrangements are determined by those with the political power to 
make the laws allocating responsibility for various tasks.  Whilst pursuit of efficiency is 
rationally justifiable from an economic perspective, and it has been demonstrated to be the 
objective of, if not perfectly achievable via, competition law, explicit inclusion of efficiency 
in a regulatory objective is not sustainable on the long-run, as the inability of an objective 
regulator to satisfy the petitions of those seeking to capture the process for their own purposes 
creates pressure for the law-maker politicians.  The supremacy of the efficiency criterion will 
persist only as long as it is congruent with the political objectives of the government of the 
day.   Governments change, and their objectives change with them.  Inevitably and 
eventually, in the absence of the ability to exercise control informally to capture the process, a 
successor government which cannot be bound by its predecessors will reverse earlier 
decisions, using its powers to either change the rules or to take over the regulatory task itself.  
The only reason that the courts administering competition law can avoid such capture is 
because their constitutional origins afford them a degree of independence not available to 
agencies that derive their mandate from political processes.   
 
Given the lack of ability to enforce an efficiency objective in the long-run via industry-
specific regulation, the only sustainable means of doing so would appear to be via 
competition law.  Imperfect though its process may be, the New Zealand experiment suggests 
that, in the absence of constitutional protections for a regulatory agency also charged with the 
pursuit of efficiency, it may be the only sustainable institutional compromise.   
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